The Experience Of Dr. Macpherson Lecturing - 1375 Words

this, arguing that, for example, I do not need to be aware of the experience of Dr. Macpherson lecturing in front of the classroom, I am simply aware of Dr. Macpherson lecturing. In other words, we can be conscious of something without being conscious of the fact that we are conscious of that thing. Dretske categorizes this consciousness into two types of awareness, that of object-awareness and that of fact-awareness. Think of a conversation that is going on around you in Leddy Library while you are studying. Although you are not aware of what they are saying, Dretske would claim that you can still hear their voices, so you are object-aware of them. It is not until, for example, someone mentions your name across the room that you become†¦show more content†¦Nagel explains this statement by using the example of the bat. We humans can explain what we think it would be like to be a bat by imagining what we think that would feel like. We can do this by picturing ourselves using sonar and sleeping upside down other characteristics of bats. We can try to access bat consciousness, but Nagel dismisses the techniques that could be used to do so. First, as mentioned, we could imagine what it is like to be a bat, but our imagination would be limited because we are different organisms. The second is that we could transform ourselves into a bat, but then we would be a bat understanding what it is like to be a bat. Therefore, we as humans would still have no consciousness or understanding of what it is like to be a bat. Rosenthal’s definition of what is consciousness revolves around two distinctions – creature consciousness and state consciousness. Creature consciousness is a state where an organism is simply awake and aware of surroundings, but that is all that needs to happen for an organism to be creature conscious. On the other hand, state consciousness involves mental and intentional states. In other words, there is an existence of beliefs and des ires. Therefore, it is argued that state consciousness is transitive, meaning there is intentionality behind an action. In terms of phenomenal